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Abstract: 
In an old boy network of nineteenth-century natural philosophers, all with a background in 
mathematics from the University of Cambridge, a conspicuous aversion ruled against 
metaphysics. Within these circles it produced a strong compulsion to define the limits of 
genuine scientific endeavour. These attempts were primarily directed against unfounded 
hypotheses trying to encompass the indefinite and all sorts of aprioristic knowledge, except 
mathematics. Either by emphasizing the formal aspects of science or linking the formalism to 
useful applications in the shape of physical models and demands for practical use, two ways in 
this crusade, not always consistent, were laid out. Nevertheless, the same natural philosophers 
were engaged in fundamental questions and manifest speculations about the constitution of 
matter, the age of the earth, the destiny of the universe, and so forth. How could that, if at all, 
yield a coherent worldview? In this article I will answer that question by looking at how a 
group of outspoken and influential Cantabrigian Wranglers were carving out intellectual, 
cultural and political space for themselves and their scientific endeavours while unremittingly 
patrolling their borders. 
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1. PATROLLING THE MATHEMATICAL BORDERS 
Provoked by a question raised by the physicist Peter Guthrie Tait at a meeting at the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh May 17, 1869 the lawyer Clement Mansfield Ingleby send an open letter 
to the editor of the newly established scientific journal Nature in order to “clearing up a most 
unfortunate confusion of thought respecting the intellectual ranks of mathematicians and 
metaphysicians”.1 
In Scotland Tait had challenged the present adherents of metaphysics to produce a 
metaphysician who was at the same time a proper mathematician. Tait himself could not think 
of a single instance. Tait’s challenge was interpreted by Ingleby as a mere badinage at the 
expense of “the science of metaphysics” displaying certain natural philosophers’ general 
dismay of that branch of knowledge. Ingleby was trained in mathematics from Trinity College 
in Cambridge, but had upon graduation taken up a position in his father’s law firm in 
Birmingham. He continued his academic interests at the Birmingham and Midland Institute—a 
young institution that provided adult scientific and technical education—teaching logic and 
metaphysics. In 1859 he moved to London to pursue an intellectual and literary career 
publishing, among other things, an Introduction to Metaphysics in two volumes during the 
1860s. 
Ingleby’s response to Tait in Nature consisted in making a taxonomy of different levels of 
mathematicians and metaphysicians. Mathematicians, he argued, could be trichotomised into 
inventors, experts and readers or students of mathematics, where metaphysicians on the other 
hand could only be divided into the two groups of creators and students of metaphysics. He 
then went on to discuss who should be on the list of natural philosophers who fulfilled the 
criteria for being put in the first groups of mathematical inventors and metaphysical creators, 
believing that it must be such persons Tait was asking for. The German philosopher Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, thought to be a genuine metaphysician, was dismissed for being only 
a reader of mathematics. Galilei Galileo and Isaac Newton, though both considered 
mathematical inventors, failed to produce metaphysical systems of their own in Ingleby’s 
opinion, which left only René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz who truly fulfilled the 
criteria. Ingleby had taken up Tait’s challenge and given him two prominent names in reply. 
Tait, in his response to Ingleby in the following issue of Nature, completely dismissed the 
trichotomy of mathematicians. His argument was that either one was a mathematician or one 
was not. No intermediate class would be possible. Being a mathematician required more than 
just the mastery of integration and differential calculus. It was important to have at least some 
sort of creative faculty, even in a very small scale. But in order to be considered a 
mathematician it was not necessary to have devised an entirely new calculus. Less would do 
and so Tait’s contemporary colleagues and fellow Cantabrigians George Gabrial Stokes, 
                                                 
1 C. M. Ingleby, “Creators of Science”, Nature 5: 62, (1869). 
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William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), James Clerk Maxwell and Arthur Cayley were included as 
mathematicians and not mere experts as they would have been in Ingleby’s taxonomy. With 
respect to metaphysicians Tait agreed with Ingleby in his division of two groups. He did not, on 
the other hand, share Ingleby’s attempt to drive the locus of the discussion into the field of 
“noble metaphysical endeavours”. Those, not being specifically defined, were admitted by Tait 
as something applicable to all men worthy of the name of mathematicians and physicists. This 
was not, however, as Ingleby believed, the interesting class of metaphysicians. Tait maintained 
his repudiative attitude towards ‘spurious metaphysics’ as being the class of “stagnation, ropes 
of sand, bitter quarrels as to the meaning of unintelligible words”, performed with pride by 
“dwellers in a sublimer sphere”.2 
The sarcasm Tait employed left no room for the peaceful reconciliation of the mathematicians 
and the metaphysicians Ingleby was hoping for. Rather, Tait sharpened the boundaries by 
ridiculing those Ingleby tried to advance as genuine metaphysicians. On that account Hegel was 
dismissed. Not on the grounds for not being a mathematician, but for being a bad 
metaphysician. Thereby Tait angled for supporters against a certain type of metaphysical 
thinking fairly popular at the time, through a common disdain for Hegel among the inner circle 
of natural philosophers in the Cambridge network. 3  Who could take seriously a German 
philosopher who tried to prove that Newton understood neither fluxions nor the law of 
gravitation? 
2. DOWNRIGHT NONSENSE 
Hegel was not popular among mid-Victorian men of science. Among those who shared Tait’s 
feelings in that regard were William Thomsen. A former student, John Hutchinson, 
remembered Thomson’s anger towards Hegel to exceed even his anger towards the Cambridge 
examination system and the British system of weights and measures: 
If you wanted to see an illustration of pure white heat you should have seen Sir William castigating 
Hegel for the audacity of his assaults on Newtonian philosophy. I remember on one occasion he sent 
over to the library for the learned volume containing Hegel’s criticism of Newton, in order that we 
might hear the ipsissima verba, the downright nonsense, of this ‘arrant impostor.’ 
The dislike of Hegel’s way of thinking came forth on several occasions. Among them in a 
lecture on the tides held in 1882. Thomson, while explaining Newton’s gravitational ideas, 
passed a remark on Hegel’s speculations about the movement of planets like blessed gods 
                                                 
2 P. G. Tait, “True and Spurious Metaphysics”, Nature 5: 81, (1869). 
3 For an introduction to the elite circles of mid-Victorian physicists see Peter Harman (ed.), Wranglers and 
physicists: studies on Cambridge physics in the nineteenth century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. 
For a more general discussion of Victorian hierarchies of knowledge see Peter C. Kjærgaard, “Competing Allies: 
Professionalisation and the Hierarchy of Science in Victorian Britain”, Centaurus 44, 248-288 (2002). For how 
Naure was used to channel and control scientific discussions see Peter C. Kjærgaard, “’Within the bounds of 
science’: Redirecting controversies to Nature”. In Louise Henson et al (eds.), Culture and science in the 
nineteenth-century media, Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, 211-222. 
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instead of stones: “If Hegel had any grain of philosophy in his ideas of the solar system, 
Newton is all wrong in his theory of the tides”; which, of course, Thomson did not believe was 
the case.4 
Tait, in other words, had the necessary intellectual backup and Ingleby was left without a case 
when trying to propagate a positive and dynamical interaction between mathematicians and 
metaphysicians. The possibility of those two groups working together was effectively turned 
down by Tait, who accordingly placed himself as “an enemy of intellectual progress” by 
Ingleby’s definition in the concluding remarks of his letter to Nature. 
Resting assured that he was not alone in his view of mathematics and metaphysics, “these two 
grand intellectual pursuits to be worthy of being cultivated together, and to be able to give 
material aid to each other”, Ingleby continued to stress that he could not: 
but look upon any man as the enemy of intellectual progress, who delights in setting one class of 
investigators against the other, and endeavours to prolong the controversy which had raged between 
them since the “Principia” [Newton’s Principia mathematica] was promulgated.5 
Ingleby’s Cambridge connection did not help him much. He was not part of the old boy 
network and for his mediating efforts he got nothing but contempt from Tait. 
3. MATHEMATICAL APHASIA AND EMPTY FORMALISM 
William Thomson had a similar disdainful attitude towards the understanding of metaphysics 
Ingleby endorsed and which was growing increasingly popular among British intellectuals. 
With an all-pervading practical sense of science intimately connecting theoretical research with 
its applications, Thomson saw a priori knowledge and idealism as impeding progress and 
consequently something to avoid in the discussion of natural philosophy. 
For Thomson the only true metaphysics was mathematics. It could be misdirected as in pure 
formal analysis or mathematics for its own sake, still being true, but lacking utility and thus 
being a waste of mental powers. Thomson’s worries in that regard even concerned the friend 
and fellow Scotsman, James Clerk Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of light. In his Baltimore 
lectures at Johns Hopkins University in 1884 Thomson was encouraging his listeners to “cure 
the mathematical disease of aphasia from which we suffered so long”.6  
                                                 
4 P. G. Tait, ibid.; Hutchinson is quoted from Silvanus P. Thompson, The Life of William Thomson - Baron Kelvin 
of Largs, London: Macmillan and Co. 1910, vol. II, p. 1122.; Thomson’s quote is from William Thomson, “The 
Tides” in Popular Lectures and Addresses, London: Macmillan & Co. 1891, vol. III, p. 154. The passage by Hegel 
that Thomson alluded to is found in G.W. F. Hegel, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in 
Grundrisse, Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner 1959, §269, pp. 223-24. 
5 C. M. Ingleby, ibid. 
6 William Thomson, Kelvin’s Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics: Historical and Philosophical 
Perspectives, R. Kargon and P. Achinstein (eds.), Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1987, p. 148. 
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Thomson was himself a skilful mathematician, but nonetheless reacted against the abstract 
formalism of the rationalistic tendencies as presented by the eminent French-Italian 
mathematician and astronomer Joseph-Louis Lagrange in his highly influential Analytical 
Mechanics from 1788. Lagrange had proudly announced that no figures would be found in his 
book: 
The methods I present require neither constructions nor geometrical or mechanical arguments, but 
solely algebraic operations subject to a regular and uniform procedure. Those who appreciate 
mathematical analysis will see with pleasure mechanics becoming a new branch of it and hence, will 
recognize that I have enlarged its domain.7 
According to Thomson this view had actually, though positively perceived by many physicists, 
damaged the natural sciences by leading them astray into empty formalism. Formalism needed 
to be conceptualized in order to deal with the representational problems of science and to yield 
useful applications. “The old mathematicians”, Thomson argued, “used neither diagrams to 
help people understand their work, nor words to express their ideas. It was formulas and 
formulas alone.”8 
The grand old man of British physics and chemistry in the last half of the nineteenth century, 
Michael Faraday, was seen as a great reformer in that respect with his language of “lines of 
force”. The Scottish engineer and physicist William John Macquorn Rankine too was 
considered by Thomson as an important contributor to this kind of reasoning by emphasizing 
the necessity of expressing physical concepts in words. In fact, Thomson went so far as to 
characterize Rankine’s genius, not as one being able to make secure foundations of his 
mathematics or explaining the substance or usefulness of his kind of matter, but through the 
enormous suggestiveness of the names in his physical hypotheses. 
4. MAKING MECHANICAL MODELS 
Although Thomson departed from the Lagrangian tradition communicated through the French 
mathematician and physicist Joseph Fourier’s work on the distribution of heat, he never 
stopped making mechanically understandable models of whatever he was working on. Fourier’s 
mathematical method had the great advantage that it was not connected with a specific physical 
model, but just provided the theory with a mechanical understandable explanation of the 
phenomena. According to Fourier the ‘primary causes’ which had often been the source of 
metaphysical speculations within the sciences were unknown. Other theories routinely implied 
assumptions about primary causes, but this question was irrelevant to Fourier’s theory. More 
specifically they were unnecessary hypotheses for his formal approach to the problems of the 
distribution of heat. His rational mechanics only considered the effects of the heat and not its 
                                                 
7 J. L. Lagrange, Analytical Mechanics: Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997, p.7. 
8 William Thomson, ibid. 
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causes. Hence, his theory was independent of the true nature of heat as its distribution could be 
represented by his differential equations alone. 
This abstract formalism of Fourier’s theoretical approach played an essential role for 
Thomson’s practical development of analogies as a heuristic tool in science. In 1841 he had 
used Fourier’s theory of heat as a successful analogy with electricity. He discovered that an 
electric charge corresponded to a heat source and could be treated mathematically in the same 
manner. The convincing results of this method were subsequently used on a variety of different 
fields covering optics, electricity, magnetism, heat and the aether. However, in Thomson’s 
quest for a true physical theory he never failed the attempt to turn mathematical analogies into 
physical analogies, always cautious of not letting the theoretical work digress into pure 
formalism. 
This was epitomized in the Baltimore lectures where he went against the formalistic tendencies 
in the electromagnetic theory of light. Although Thomson firmly believed in an electromagnetic 
theory of light, he did not want it to be founded upon mathematical formulas alone. Instead he 
wanted it to be made comprehensible through a dynamical theory: 
I never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical 
model I can understand it. As long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I cannot 
understand; and this is why I cannot get the electro-magnetic theory.9 
Because of its aprioristic characters Thomson interpreted the mathematical formalism of 
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of light as a kind of metaphysics. It was not the same kind of 
philosophical metaphysics that Hegel espoused causing Thomson’s anger. Lacking the proper 
mechanical foundation Maxwell’s metaphysics was considered true, as it still belonged to 
mathematics. But Thomson thought it was misdirected and should be made useful to get back 
on the right scientific path again. 
Like Tait had done in his rant against metaphysical philosophy, Thomson employed a 
distinction between good and bad metaphysics. Good formalistic scientific metaphysics could 
be misdirected, but was essentially true. Metaphysics in the bad sense were most likely false, 
Thomson argued. This was the case when wordy description was placed above rigid description. 
In such cases the problem was that not only was the language empty, but in the epistemological 
hierarchy it was also placed above the substance it needed as a foundation. Thomson’s view on 
the false metaphysics was put forth on several occasions. It should be readily dismissed. True 
metaphysics should be worked upon. There was nothing above and beyond practical use. In a 
1883 lecture on ‘Electrical units of measurement’, he summed it up: “the life and soul of 
science is its practical application”.10 
                                                 
9 William Thomson, ibid., p. 206. 
10 William Thomson “Electrical units of measurement”, in Popular Lectures and Addresses, London: Macmillan & 
Co. 1891, vol. I, pp. 75-6. 
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To give an example of what Thomson’s emphasis on the necessity of practical application in 
the physical sciences meant, we can look at his scrupulous work on the tides. There was no 
question that it was impossible to avoid theorising and that a tidal theory had to be carried 
along with elaborated tidal observations. Clearly, to Thomson, it was not enough merely to lean 
upon definitions to avoid ambiguities and errors in the development of a tidal theory, as had 
been the case before Newton’s gravitational theory. Galileo was applauded for noticing that the 
tidal theory coming from the German astronomer Johannes Kepler was “a lamentable piece of 
mysticism”. But lacking a proper theory to work with Galileo was not able to do anything about 
it. The metaphysics of the early theories of the tides lacked a theoretical framework founded 
upon observation, conceptual coherence and mathematical innovation. The incitation though, 
both for the early and later theories of the tides as well as for Thomson, was a practical concern 
for securing harbours, helping ships to navigate and in the event make use of the tides. The 
work carried out by Thomson implied “the grand philosophical chain of the Newtonian theory” 
and the subtleties of physical astronomy, numerous observations and reports from around the 
world, the making of sensitive instruments, experiments, calculations, making of tables, and so 
on. All this combined into a unity revolving around the practical use of a theory of tides.11 
With respect to science there was nothing at the side or above practical application. But that 
was not only a question of metaphysics being methodologically unnecessary, it was also 
morally wrong. The aspect of practicality combined with Thomson’s Victorian capitalist vision 
produced a unity of personal profit and public welfare, which would bring profits to investors, 
strength to the Empire, and material benefits to mankind. On the other hand metaphysical 
speculations and the like would bring uncertainty, divisiveness, and ruin.12 For Thomson, the 
combination of physical and practical knowledge simply ruled out the necessity for 
metaphysics. Trying to force it upon scientific enterprises would only damage the sciences and 
their ability to yield useful solutions for practical needs. 
5. THE END OF THE WORLD 
The openly declared condemnation of metaphysics made neither Tait nor Thomson to refrain 
from elaborated speculations about the nature of things. The most explicit example from Tait is 
The Unseen Universe (1875) and the sequel Paradoxical Philosophy (1878) written in 
collaboration with Balfour Stewart. The Unseen Universe had the subtitle Physical 
Speculations on a Future State and was an attempt to provide Victorian physics with a 
consistent ontological foundation including energy conservation, the aether, the second law of 
thermodynamics, and the vortex atom, immune to destruction or dissipation. But also Thomson 
was grappling with big issues. 
                                                 
11 Cf. William Thomson, “The Tides”, pp. 152-55 and pp. 168-71. 
12 Cf. C. Smith and N. Wise, Energy and Empire: a biographical study of Lord Kelvin, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1989, pp. 454-5. 
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One of the major problems arising as a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics was 
that even though energy was conserved, it was irreversibly and progressively dissipated. At the 
annual British Association meeting in 1854 Thomson argued that if the thermodynamic actions 
were traced forward in time, “we find that the end of this world as a habitation for man, or for 
any living creature or plant at present existing in it, is mechanically inevitable”.13 
Along with Thomson the German physicist Rudolph Clausius had been instrumental in the 
development of thermodynamic theory in the 1850s. However, he did not comment on 
Thomson’s prediction of the end of the world until 1865. Finally recognizing the significance 
of Thomson’s dissipation principle, Clausius introduced the concept of entropy as a convenient 
way of stating the directional character of cosmic processes. Thus, Clausius was able to 
conclude his paper with the “two fundamental theorems of the mechanical theory of heat”: 1) 
The energy of the universe is constant, and 2) The entropy of the universe tends to a 
maximum.14 
In a lecture three years later Clausius explicitly commented on the consequences of the entropy 
tending to its maximum. The occasions for further changes would diminish and supposing the 
conditions of the highest possible entropy would be obtained, the universe, Clausius concluded, 
would be in a state of unchanging death.15  This was to be known and feared in Victorian 
society as “the heat death”: molecular uniformity in the entire universe preventing any forms of 
life as we know it. 
6. CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN NATURE 
Although some attempts were made in order to avoid this conclusion, it was a widespread 
belief that the consequences of the second law of thermodynamics were inevitable. This line 
was also taken up by Stewart and Tait, but they were led to quite a different interpretation from 
most of their colleagues. One of the aims of The Unseen Universe was to refute the materialism, 
which they thought dominated Victorian science. Stewart and Tait wanted to demonstrate that 
immortality was strictly in accordance to the fundamental principle of continuity in physics. 
They agreed with John Tyndall, who became Michael Faraday’s successor at the Royal 
Institution in London, in the emphasis on continuity in nature, giving science the ability to deal 
with all aspects of the natural world. Tyndall had boldly expressed this strong belief in a 
justification of continuity in his Fragments of Science: 
Believing, as I do, in the continuity of nature, I cannot stop abruptly where our microscopes cease to 
be of use [..]. By a necessity engendered and justified by science I cross the boundary of the 
experimental evidence, and discern in that Matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, 
                                                 
13 William Thomson, Report of the British Association of the Advancement of Science 24, (II), 59, (1854). 
14 Rudolf Clausius, Annalen der Physik [2] 125, 353, (1895). 
15 Cf. Rudolf Clausius, Philosophical Magazine [4] 35, 405, (1868). 
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and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, 
the promise and potency of terrestrial life.16 
The materialistic philosophy implied by Tyndall’s arguments, on the other hand, was not 
followed by Stewart and Tait. One way of dealing with the problems involved when science 
bounced against the boundaries of the indefinite was a clear-cut separation of what belonged to 
science and what did not, as in Thomson’s rejection of metaphysical speculation. But at the 
same time these discussions had produced a kind of familiarity with a divine providence in 
theoretical discussions about the nature and limits of science. 
Thus, for the English polymath and Cambridge don William Whewell, discontinuities—as he 
perceived the introduction of, for example, new species, and changes of the earths surface, and 
so forth—was seen as direct evidence for a divine intervention. The domain of science did not 
embrace these issues. The same was the case for the creation of the world. It was indeed 
possible to register the events in the sciences, but one should refrain from explaining them. 
Whewell put this argument forth in Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their 
history from 1840: “science can teach us nothing positive respecting the beginning of things [..]. 
[T]he providential history of the world has its own beginning and its own evidence”.17 
7. THE VISIBLE AND BEYOND 
To the practical man of mid-Victorian physics, William Thomson, there was no conflict 
between science and the idea of an “intelligent and benevolent design in nature”.18 James Clerk 
Maxwell, too, agreed on this, but he warned that science had indeed limits. In a lecture on 
molecules delivered at the British Association in Bradford in 1872 he reasoned: 
we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which Science must stop. 
Not that Science is debarred from studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot 
take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in 
tracing back the history of matter Science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that 
the molecule has been made, and on the other, that it has not been made by any of the processes we 
call natural. Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of noting. We 
have reached the utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that because matter 
cannot be eternal and self-existent it must have been created.19 
                                                 
16 John Tyndall, Fragments of Science: A Series of Detached Essays, Addresses and Reviews, London: 1879, II. p. 
193; quoted from P. M. Heinmann, “The Unseen Universe: Physics and the Philosophy of Nature in Victorian 
Britain”, BJHS, 6 (1972), 73-79, p. 73. 
17 William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their History, London: 1840, II, p. 143; 
quoted from Heinmann, ibid., p. 74. 
18 William Thomson, Popular Lectures and Addresses, ii, p. 203 (quoted from Heinmann, ibid. p. 75.) 
19 James Clerk Maxwell, “Molecules”, The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, New York: Dover 
Publications, 1965, II. p. 376.  
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Stewart and Tait dismissed Maxwell’s demarcation of science and metaphysical speculations, 
while defending the latter on the grounds of scientific objectivity. The premise of their 
arguments was that the second law of thermodynamics predicted the end of the known universe 
while the principle of uniformity of nature denied such consequence. The latter was the case 
because the concept of uniformity did not only affirm the constancy of natural laws but also 
postulated a continuity of action within the natural order. 
It was a fact that the known universe had been created and it was now known through the 
infallible laws of physics that it would come to an end. “The visible universe”, Stewart and Tait 
maintained, “must, certainly in transformable energy, and probably in matter come to an end. 
We cannot escape from this conclusion,” and continued, that due to “the principle of Continuity 
upon which all such arguments are based still demanding a continuance of the universe, we are 
forced to believe that there is something beyond that which is visible”.20 
The visible and that which was beyond, the invisible universe, were connected by means of the 
transference of energy from one universe to the other. This allowed the dissipation of energy to 
be considered as a gradual transference into an invisible order of things while energy travelled 
outward through space. The all-pervasive aether filling space, according to the Victorian 
theories of physics, was thought to be more than just a bridge between different portions of the 
visible universe; it was supposedly a bridge between one order of things and another, so that 
when energy was carried from matter to the aether, it was carried from the visible to the 
invisible universe. Due to the fundamental law of the conservation of energy, which applied to 
the total operations of nature, the system comprising the visible and the invisible was seen as a 
self-contained system manifesting its own activity. 
Manifestations of divine providence such as the creation of the visible universe and life was not 
explained as discontinuities or occurrence of unforeseen events, but instead by transfer of 
energy from the invisible to the visible universe. Such events, seemingly inexplicable without 
divine intervention or violation of the continuity-concept, should, Stewart and Tait claimed, “no 
longer be regarded as absolute breaks of continuity [..], but only as the result of a peculiar 
action of the invisible upon the visible universe”.21 
In this way Stewart and Tait themselves thought to have reconciled the insurmountable 
dilemmas of physics and theology without violating any known laws of nature. The 
interference of a “Divine Govenor”, an intelligent agency resident in the invisible universe 
acting through energy-transfer upon the visible, was to be viewed a ‘being’ “not in defiance of 
law, but in fulfilment of it”.22 
                                                 
20 Balfour Stewart and Peter Guthrie Tait, The Unseen Universe, or Speculations on a Future State, London: 1875, 
p. 90ff.; quoted from Heinmann, ibid., p. 77. 
21 Stewart and Tait, ibid., p. 189; cf. Heinmann, ibid. p. 78. 
22 Stewart and Tait, ibid, .pp. 60ff.; cf. Heinmann, ibid. 
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8. DEMARCATIONISM 
Stewart and Tait were not happy about the demarcationist reaction in science advocated by 
Maxwell and the Oxford mathematician and Anglican priest Baden Powell, among others. 
Powell had argued against a mixture of the miraculous and the study of the natural order, by 
clearly separating their domains: 
It is the province of science to investigate nature—it can contemplate nothing but in connection with 
the order of nature—it cannot point to anything out of nature [..]. It is evident that the supernatural 
can never be a matter of science or knowledge; for the moment it is brought within the cognisance of 
reason it ceases to be supernatural.23 
Reviewing the sequel to The Unseen Universe in Nature Maxwell was unyielding in his 
demarcation of what could belong to a scientific discourse and what could not:  
Nature is a journal of science, and one of the severest tests of a scientific mind is to discern the limits 
of the legitimate application of scientific methods. We shall therefore endeavour to keep within the 
bounds of science in speaking of the subject-matter of this book, remembering that there are many 
things in heaven and earth which by the selection required for the application of our scientific 
methods, have been excluded from our philosophy.24 
Stewart and Tait could not be accused of entrapping the readers into some peculiar form of 
theological belief, Maxwell argued, recognising the effort to communicate the results of 
modern science to layman. “No book” [ i.e. The Unseen Universe], he wrote, “containing so 
much thoroughly scientific matter would have passed through seven editions in so short time 
without the allurement of some human interest”.25 
Although Maxwell went seriously into the discussion about life after death, the question of the 
human soul, and so on, admitting the merits of general human interest, by the end of the day 
there was no question at all that this was not and could not be a scientific discussion. As soon 
as such questions were raised we got beyond the limits of science, Maxwell argued and 
concluded that: 
The progress of science, therefore, so far as we have been able to follow it, has added nothing of 
importance to what has already been known about the physical consequences of death, but has rather 
tended to deepen the distinction between the visible part, which perishes before our eyes, and that 
which we are ourselves, and to shew that this personality, with respect to its nature as well as to its 
destiny, lies quite beyond the range of science.26 
                                                 
23 Baden Powell, The Order of Nature Considered in Reference to the Claims of Revelations, London: 1859, p. 110; 
cf. Heinmann, ibid., p. 74. 
24 James Clerk Maxwell, “Paradoxical Philosophy”, The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, II, p. 760. 
25 James Clerk Maxwell, ibid., p. 757. 
26 James Clerk Maxwell, ibid., p. 762. 
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Stewart and Tait went too far and in the process left the sciences. Maxwell would not and could 
not accept that. But he understood, in a way none of the mathematicians from the old boy 
Cambridge network understood or accepted speculative metaphysics. To them there was a 
difference. 
9. STATISTICS AND DEMONS 
The demarcationist reaction became imperative in the discussions of the molecular foundation 
of thermodynamics. In the mid-1860s Clausius was working with a quantity he called 
‘disgregation’ which depended on molecular arrangements. It was never clearly related to 
actual positions and velocities of molecules, but nonetheless demonstrated Clausius’ attempt to 
make his macroscopic mechanical theory of heat intelligible based upon microscopical 
unobservable molecular assumptions. 
However, Clausius was very careful in emphasizing the distinction between his formulation of 
the general laws of thermodynamics and his more specific assumptions of the constituting 
matter, stressing that his attempt to provide a mechanical explanation for thermodynamic 
processes was only supplementary to his prior attempt to establish the laws of thermodynamics 
as axioms independent of material assumptions.27 Thus, Clausius expressed a general tendency 
of prudence in nineteenth-century physics, basing theoretical formalism on observation while 
trying to formulate general principles not critically depending upon assumptions of the 
constitution of matter. The physical theory itself should be constructed in such a way that it 
would not have to be abandoned if the conception changed of how the material world was 
connected and of what. 
Maxwell never felt at ease with Clausius’ introduction of the disgregation-concept as an 
expression for the molecular configuration. For Maxwell there was nothing clarifying in this 
reference to a mechanical model of molecules, rather it confused the conceptual structure of 
thermodynamics. Maxwell himself defined this as the investigation of the dynamical and 
thermal properties of bodies deduced entirely from the two laws of thermodynamics, without 
any hypotheses about the molecular constitution of bodies. In contrast to Clausius, Maxwell 
argued that the second law of thermodynamics was a statistical law dealing with a very large 
number of molecules and should be understood as such, not explained by the movements of 
single molecules. 
To illustrate his point, Maxwell suggested the thought-experiment of a ‘finite being’–later by 
Thomson called a demon–neat-fingered, very intelligent and able to sort slow moving 
molecules from fast moving by opening and closing a hole between two chambers without any 
use of additional energy. This ‘being’ would contradict one of the basic assumptions of the 
second law of thermodynamics, namely the transport of heat from a cold body to a warmer 
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without the performance of external work on the system.  Maxwell did not want to speculate 
about the possibility of such a situation, but merely point to the possibility of similar 
spontaneous fluctuations on the molecular level where heat was transported from colder bodies 
to warmer by the random motions of the molecules. This happened all the time, Maxwell 
argued, but without violating the second law of thermodynamics. 
The point was that the second law was not a mechanical law, but a law only dealing with 
statistical certainty. There would be nothing contradictory for mechanics and the conservation 
of energy by the assumption of a regulating ‘being’. Furthermore, it would not violate the 
second law since it was not a dynamical law concerned with single molecules, but a statistical 
description working on a macroscopic level. Therefore Maxwell dismissed Clausius’ attempt to 
describe the second law in terms of individual molecular motions, even though Clausius 
himself emphasized the difference between the theoretical level of the second law and the 
mechanical illustration. Although Maxwell and Clausius fully agreed on the status of the 
theoretical description, Maxwell did not accept this distinction since it had the possibility of 
confusing the lack of connection between the two working descriptive levels of 
thermodynamics, namely the statistical and the deterministic.  
For the Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, who in the 1860s tried and failed to make a 
secure mechanical foundation of the second law by attempting to construct a theorem of 
mechanics that corresponded to it, the importance of demonstrating the statistical interpretation 
of the second law was also used to show the necessity of a theoretical independency with 
respect to physical assumptions. Although Boltzmann firmly believed in an atomistic 
foundation of the material world, he continuously stressed that this was just one among many 
possible physical interpretations; it was probable, he thought, but it could never be certain. 
Therefore, physical theories should be kept at a general level, not letting them depend critically 
on physical assumptions. Boltzmann also dismissed the dynamical interpretation of the second 
law in favour of Maxwell’s statistical interpretation. As part of the work from the 1870s on 
while trying to formulate a statistical proof for the second law, Boltzmann derived a formula 
expressing the increase of the entropy in an isolated system whenever irreversible processes 
occurred. This was later to be known as the ‘H-theorem’. 
Another result from this work was the probabilistic interpretation of the increase of entropy. 
Since the second law was a statistical law, it could not state anything with absolute necessity, 
but it could say that it would be exceedingly improbable that the entropy in a given system 
would decrease.  Having introduced probability in thermodynamics, the increase of entropy 
could be described as the tendency of a thermodynamic system to reach the most probable 
molecular distribution. Hence, a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics was that 
the irreversibility of natural processes followed from the tendency of the system to reach the 
most probable thermodynamic state, namely that of thermal equilibrium. Consequently, the 
irreversible increase of entropy in thermodynamic systems was characterized as an irreducible 
statistical law. 
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10. ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, MIGRAINES AND METAPHYSICS 
The German physicist Max Planck challenged Maxwell and Boltzmann’s statistical 
interpretation and in the 1890s advanced the view that the second law of thermodynamics 
possessed absolute certainty. Accordingly, Planck tried to connect the ontological assumptions 
of a mechanical worldview with a purely thermodynamic theory without any statistical 
explanations. However, as a result of his study of the irreversibility of radiation processes 
which lead to the introduction of the quantum theory in 1900, Planck eventually accepted 
Boltzmann’s probabilistic interpretation of entropy and the statistical view on the second law of 
thermodynamics. 
Maxwell and Boltzmann’s statistical interpretation of thermodynamics was kept on the level of 
description, not making a molecular explanation submitting itself to ontological commitments. 
Their theories refrained from expanding the domain of validity to count for the mechanical 
structure at the molecular level and thereby maintained the demarcationist attitude held by a 
number of physicists in the late nineteenth century. One of them was the German Heinrich 
Hertz, who in his axiomatic attempt to free mechanics from contradictions, claimed that even 
though his system of mechanics was sufficient for representing the motion of inanimate matter 
it appeared, he argued, “too simple and narrow to account for even the lowest processes of 
life”.28 
In a lecture at the Vienna Philosophical Society in 1905 on the German atheistic pessimist 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s incompetence as a philosopher, Boltzmann followed Hertz’ line of 
thought and spoke for prudence in theorizing combined with a unification of our laws of 
thought and corresponding experience. This “would ensure”, Boltzmann argued, “cessation of 
the disquit and the embarrasing feeling that it is a riddle that we are here, that the world is at all 
and it is as it is, that it is incomprehensible what is the cause of this regular connection between 
cause and effect, and so on”. By stopping asking such questions, he concluded, “Men would be 
freed from the spiritual migraine that is called metaphysics”.29 
By the early twentieth century the anti-metaphysical campaign advanced by the Victorian old 
boy network of Cantabrigian Wranglers from Peterhouse and Trinity College in Cambridge was 
easily digested and appropriated by continental German speaking physicists. Metaphysical 
philosophy was readily dismissed as utter nonsense unworthy of any serious thought. On the 
other hand, it was perfectly acceptable to speculate wildly within a scientific framework as long 
as one belonged to the club. Tait had dismissed philosophers for wild metaphysical speculation. 
Ingleby, himself a Cambridge mathematics graduate, was trying to mediate. But not belonging 
to the inner circles of elite physicists and influential Wranglers he failed. Later, when Maxwell 
did not agree with Stewart and Tait in their holistic interpretation of thermodynamics and 
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dismissed their books for going beyond the bounds of science, he still accepted them as peers. 
It would have been an entirely different matter had they been philosophers. 
As physicists disagreed where to draw the line they stood united in not letting philosophers into 
their domain. They also disagreed about the ontological status of the physical reality their 
theories were describing. But again, this was acceptable as long as the discussion was among 
fellow physicists. There was plenty of space to disagree within science. If, however, 
philosophers tried to intervene, the migraine mounted. To prevent that, the self-proclaimed 
sentinels of science kept their guard. 
